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involve any actual communication among the parties to the
agreement.15  As the court noted, “if a firm raises price in the
expectation that its competitors will do likewise, and they do,
the firm’s behavior can be conceptualized as the offer of a
unilateral contract that the offerees accept by raising their
prices.”16
The court noted that, in the absence of an admission by the
defendants that they agreed to fix prices, evidence must be
presented from which the existence of such an agreement can
be inferred.17  The court explained that the evidence generally
takes the form of—(1) a showing that the structure of the
market was such as to make price fixing feasible and (2)
evidence that the market behaved in a non-competitive
manner.18  In addressing the defense argument that some of the
transactions occurred at a lower price then the level pegged by
the alleged price fixing activity, the court echoed Justice
Stone’s comments in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.19 in
stating that¾
“The reasonable price fixed today may through economic
and business changes become the unreasonable price of
tomorrow.”
The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the structure of the
market was conducive to price fixing behavior and that, during
the period of the alleged conspiracy, the defendants avoided or
at least limited price competition.20  Moreover, there was
testimony involving statements by one of the defendants’ plant
managers that, “We have an understanding within the industry
not to undercut each other’s prices.”21
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the grant of
summary judgment and sent the case back for trial to establish
whether there was a price fixing violation.
In conclusion
The June 18 decision breathes new life into price fixing
litigation.  Proving an explicit agreement to fix prices is
difficult; proving that the parties avoided or limited price
competition in a setting that is favorable for price fixing is
substantially more attainable.  This decision could have
important implications for cases arising in the future.  The
prospect of treble damages in a civil case22 provides an
economic incentive to challenge such practices.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
FENCE . The disputed land was located between the
parties’ lands. An unknown previous owner of one of the
properties erected a barbed-wire fence between the properties
but 45 to 60 feet on the plaintiff’s side of the actual boundary.
The defendants presented no evidence of why the fence was
located there. The evidence demonstrated that the several
owners of the two properties did not discuss or object to the
fence and no one had claimed that the fence was the true
boundary. The court noted that the defendants did not provide
any evidence that the boundary was in dispute or that the
fence was erected to determine the boundary. The  evidence
showed that the defendants’ predecessors in interest made
only sporadic use of the disputed land and only as incidental
to the use of the whole property.  The court held that the
defendants did not acquire title to the disputed land by
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adverse possession because neither they nor their
predecessors ever made continuous use of the land for at least
ten years. The court also that title was not determined by
building the fence under an agreement or by acquiescence
because the boundary was not in dispute before the fence was
erected and no evidence was presented that the fence was
erected to establish a boundary. Gibbons v. Lettow, 42 P.3d
925 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISCHARGE . The debtor purchased two cotton pickers
from a dealer with an installment loan. The debtor defaulted
on the loans but provided two post-dated checks to cover the
deficit on the loan. However, the checks were not honored
and the debtor continued to use the pickers for another two
months. The creditor argued that the loss of value of the
pickers during those two months created a nondischargeable
debt. The creditor sought to have the debt declared
nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(2) for a debt obtained
through false representation. In a motion for summary
judgment, the debtor argued that the unpaid checks were not
representations but mere promises. The debtor also argued
that the damages resulting from the continued possession and
use of the pickers did not create a debt. The court held that
the loss of value of the pickers occurring after the checks
were given and not paid was a debt which could be
nondischargeable under Section 523. Although the court held
that most of the elements of false representation were
demonstrated by the unpaid checks, the court held that
summary judgment was not proper because evidence was
needed to determine whether the debtor had the intent to use
the checks as a method to deceive the creditor. In re
Ellington, 276 B.R. 470 (Bankr. N.D. Minn. 2000).
The debtor borrowed money for the financing of the
debtor’s farming operation. The debtor defaulted on the loans
and sold some of the collateral to pay off most of the loans.
However, the debtor sold some of the collateral and did not
use the proceeds to pay off the remainder of the loans. The
creditor sought to have the remainder of the loans declared
nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(6) for willful and
malicious harm to the creditor. The court held that the
debtor’s experience as a farmer and the clear indication that
the debtor’s property served as collateral for the loans proved
that the sale of the collateral was willful and malicious and
the unpaid loan amount was nondischargeable. In r  Jones,
276 B.R. 797 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).
CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
ELIGIBILITY . The debtor was a corporation solely
owned by a farmer. The farmer had individually incurred
debts to the FSA. When the FSA attempted to foreclose on
the collateral securing the debt, the farmer transferred all
property and debt to a corporation in exchange for stock and
a promissory note. The issue was whether the debt was an
obligation of the corporation such that it would have
sufficient debt from farming operations to be eligible for
Chapter 12. The court found that the FSA regulations
prohibited the assignment or transfer of FSA debt by the
farmer; therefore, the court held that the FSA debt was not an
obligation of the corporation and the corporation had
insufficient debt from farming to qualify as a Chapter 12
debtor. In re McSwine Creek Farms, Inc., 276 B.R. 461
(Bankr. N.D. Minn. 2000).
CONTRACTS
REVOCATION. The plaintiff purchased a used tractor
from the defendant dealer. The tractor was used for fall farm
work but had to be repaired after it stalled. The tractor was
also used the following spring until it stalled again. The
plaintiff had the tractor inspected and discovered that the
wrong o-rings were installed in the hydraulic system. The
plaintiff sued for breach of express and implied warranties,
fraud, misrepresentation and deceit. The defendant argued
that the plaintiff waited too long to report the defect in the
tractor in that the tractor was used more than 160 hours
before the plaintiff claimed a defect.  The court noted that
N.D. C.C. § 41-02-70(3)(a) allowed a purchaser a reasonable
time to  notify a seller of a defect. The court reviewed several
cases involving the reasonable time to report a defect in a
farm tractor and determined that the trial court was not in
clear error to rule that the plaintiff reported the alleged defect
within a reasonable time. Eggl v. Letvin Equipment Co.,
632 N.W.2d 435 (N.D. 2001).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
APPLES. The CCC has issued proposed regulations which
establish the Apple Market Loss Assistance Payment
Program II which provides direct payments to apple
producers to provide relief due to the low prices received for
the 2000 crop. 67 Fed. Reg. 47477 (July 19, 2002).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. The decedent’s estate
claimed deductions for interest on overpayment of estate tax,
attorney’s fees, executor’s fees, and miscellaneous expenses.
The IRS argued that the interest was not deductible because
the interest would eventually be returned as a refund. The
court held that the interest was deductible because it was
already paid and any refunded portion would be included in
income when refunded. The other expenses were approved by
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the probate court but the IRS challenged the expenses for
lack of substantiation. The court held that the acceptance of
the validity of the expenses by the state court was sufficient
evidence to support the deductions. Helis v. United States,
2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,445 (Fed. Cls. 2002).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
AUTOMOBILE EXPENSES. The taxpayer was self-
employed in the hardwood flooring business and used a
pickup truck in the business. The taxpayer claimed
deductions for the actual expenses of the pickup for one year,
but did not keep sufficient record of all the expenses to meet
the substantiation requirements of I.R.C. § 7491. Therefore,
the court held that the taxpayer was eligible only for a
deduction based on the standard mileage rate. The court
upheld the IRS determination of the number of miles, based
on a reconstruction of the use of the pickup. Nobles v.
Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2002-86.
BAD DEBTS. The taxpayer loaned money to the
taxpayer’s child to enable the child to purchase a residence.
The loan was evidenced by a promissory note with interest
above the federal rate and was secured by a second deed of
trust. The child made payments on the loan but eventually
had to sell the residence. The taxpayer received the proceeds
in excess of the first mortgage. The court held that the
taxpayer was entitled to a nonbusiness bad debt deduction for
the amount of the loan less the amount recovered in the sale.
McFadden v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2002-166.
COOPERATIVES . February 1, 2002, the IRS Appeals
Division has decoordinated the Industry Specialization
Program (ISP) Coordinated Issue Settlement Guidelines for
farmers cooperatives dealing with the disposition of capital
stock. IRPO ¶ 180,245.
DISASTER PAYMENTS . On June 26, 2002, the
President determined that certain areas in Alaska were
eligible for assistance under the Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, as a result of
flooding on April 27, 2002 through June 7, 2002. FEMA-
1423-DR. On July 3, 2002, the president determined that
certain areas in Montana were eligible for assistance under
the Act as a result of severe storms and flooding on June 8,
2002. FEMA-1426-DR. On July 4, 2002, the president
determined that certain areas in Texas were eligible for
assistance under the Act as a result of severe storms and
flooding on June 29, 2002. FEMA-1425-DR. Accordingly, a
taxpayer who sustained a loss attributable to these disasters
may deduct the loss on his or her 2001 federal income tax
return.
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS . The taxpayer was a corporation
which manufactured and sold a printing press attachment.
The taxpayer held an annual fishing trip which was attended
by employees, although not all employees attended. The
fishing trip was planned so as to encourage employees to
freely discuss the manufacturing and sales business and
includ d ormal meetings as well as informal conversations
during the fishing activities. The court found that the
employees spent from one to three hours each day discussing
taxpayer business. The IRS assessed a deficiency of
employment taxes based on the value of the fishing trip as
recreation expenses for the employees. The IRS sought a
summary judgment that the assessment was proper because
the taxpayer could not meet the standards of I.R.C. § 274.
The taxpayer argued that Section 274 did not apply because
the taxpayer was not seeking a deduction for the trip
expenses. The court held that the issue was whether the
expenses were deductible by the employees because if the
employees were entitled to deductions, the expenses would
be ordinary and necessary business expenses and not wages
from the taxpayer.  The court held that summary judgment
was not proper because assuming that the taxpayer could
show that the fishing trips constitute ordinary and necessary
business travel expenses, a material issue of fact remained
regarding whether the taxpayer could meet the heightened
standard set by I.R.C. § 274. Townsend Industries, Inc v.
United States, 2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,518 (S.D.
Iowa 2002).
HOME OFFICE.  The taxpayer was a medical doctor who
also made movies for use in the taxpayer’s medical practice,
provided religious and spiritual guidance to patients,
marketed music written by the taxpayer’s father, and
composed music. The taxpayer stored equipment and
materials for these nonmedical activities in the taxpayer’s
residence and claimed a deduction for two-thirds of the
residential expenses as business expenses. The IRS and the
court denied these deductions because the taxpayer failed to
substantiate the extent of the exclusive use of the residence
for these activities, the amount of income from these
activities and that the residence was the principal place of
business for these activities. Edwards v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 2002-169.
The taxpayer operated a small after-hours school, gave
private violin lessons and composed music. The school
cl sses were given in rented school buildings and the lessons
and composing took place in one bedroom (the studio) of the
taxpayer’s residence.  The taxpayer claimed home office
deductions for that bedroom and one other bedroom. The
other bedroom was used only incidentally for the taxpayer’s
businesses and the court denied all home office deductions
for that room. The court found that the taxpayer used three-
quarters of the studio bedroom exclusively for he taxpayer’s
composing and private lessons; therefore, the taxpayer was
entitled to deduct three-quarters of the residential expenses
associated with the studio room. Huang v. Comm’r, T.C.
Summary Op. 2002-93.
INCOME AVERAGING . The IRS has requested
comments, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995, concerning final regulations issued under I.R.C. § 1301
which allows an individual engaged in a farming business to
elect to reduce regular tax liability by treating all or a portion
of the current year's farming income as if it had been earned
in qual proportions over the prior three years. See 13 Agric.
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L. Dig. 14 (Jan. 18, 2002). Written comments should be
submitted on or before September 6, 2002, to Glenn P.
Kirkland, IRS, Room 6411, 1111 Constitution Ave., NW.,
Washington, D.C. 20224.
LOTTERY WINNINGS . The taxpayer won the Oregon
Lottery and was to receive annual payments for 20 years.
After five years, the taxpayer decided to assign the remaining
payments to a third party in exchange for a lump sum
payment. The taxpayer characterized the lump sum as long-
term capital gain. The court acknowledged that the case was
without precedent and needed a decision by an appellate
court, but held that, because the original proceeds were
classified as ordinary income, the lump sum payment was
also ordinary income, even though received from an
assignment of the right to receive the annual payments.
McGinnis v. United States, 2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,494 (D. Or. 2002).
The taxpayer won the California State Lottery and was to
receive annual payments for 20 years. The taxpayer decided
to assign a portion of the remaining payments to a third party
in exchange for a lump sum payment. The taxpayer
characterized the lump sum as long-term capital gain. Under
the lottery rules, the right to the winnings could not be
assigned or transferred to third parties but the taxpayer
obtained a court order permitting the assignment. The court
held that, because the original proceeds were classified as
ordinary income, the lump sum payment was also ordinary
income, even though received from an assignment of the
right to receive the annual payments. Davis v. Comm’r, 119
T.C. No 1 (2002).
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
LOANS. The partnership had a corporation as a partner and
the issue was whether a loan made by a corporate partner was
a liability of the partnership. The loan was made solely in the
name of the corporation, the corporation was solely liable for
repayment of the loan, and the corporation was not acting as
an agent of the partnership in obtaining the loan. The court
held, in an opinion designated as not for publication, that the
loan was not a partnership obligation; therefore, the partners
could not increase their bases in the partnership by the loan
amount. Dynadeck Rotary Systems, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 2002-
2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,504 (9th Cir. 2002).
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in July 2002, the
weighted average is 5.67 percent with the permissible range
of 5.10 to 6.23 percent (90 to 120 percent permissible range)
and 5.10 to 6.80 percent (90 to 110 percent permissible
range) for purposes of determining the full funding limitation
under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 2002-49, I.R.B. 2002-28.
RETURNS. The taxpayer was living with a same sex
partner and claimed the partner as a deduction on the
taxpayer’s income tax return, although the taxpayer had
crossed out all references to “spouse” on the return. The
taxpayer used the “married filing joint return” tax schedule,
although the taxpayer marked out the term “married” on the
return. The court noted that no change in the taxpayer’s
marital status under state or federal law had occurred since
the same issue was litigated for previous tax returns in
Mueller v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-132, aff’d, 2001-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,391 (7th Cir. 2001); therefore, the court
held that the taxpayer could not use the joint return tax
schedule or claim the standard deduction for joint returns.
The appellate court affirmed in a decision designated as not
for publication. Mueller v. Comm’r, 2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,505 (7th Cir. 2002), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2001-
274.
The IRS has announced the publication of revised
Publication 551, Basis of Assets; Publication 583, Starting a
Bu iness and Keeping Records. Ann. 2002-61, I.R.B. 2002-
__; Ann. 2002-62, I.R.B. 2002-__. The IRS has put its new
life expectancy tables into Publication 590 SUPP,
Supplement to Publication 590, Individual Retirement
Arrangements (IRAs). The life expectancy tables were part of
the final regulations on required distributions from retirement
plans. For year 2002, taxpayers have the option of using the
new life expectancy tables or the tables in the existing
Publication 590. IR-2002-86 These publications can be
obtained by calling 1-800-TAX-FORM (1-800-829-3676);
they are also available on the IRS's website at www.irs.gov.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ELIGIBLE SHAREHOLDERS. The decedent was the
grantor and trustee of a trust which owned all the stock of an
S corporation. At the death of the decedent, two of the
decedent’s heirs became successor trustees and were required
to distribute the stock to themselves as provided in the trust
instrument. The estate made an election to pay estate tax in
installments and the executor held the trust stock until the
installments had all been paid, at which time the stock will be
distributed to the trust and eventually to the heirs. The IRS
ruled that the executor was an eligible shareholder during the
administration of the estate, including the period of the
installment payment of the estate tax. L r. Rul 200226031,
March 26, 2002.




AFR 2.54 2.52 2.51 2.51
110 percent AFR 2.79 2.77 2.76 2.75
120 percent AFR 3.04 3.02 3.01 3.00
Mid-term
AFR 4.24 4.20 4.18 4.16
110 percent AFR 4.67 4.62 4.59 4.58
120 percent AFR 5.10 5.04 5.01 4.99
Long-term
AFR 5.46 5.39 5.35 5.33
110 percent AFR 6.02 5.93 5.89 5.86
120 percent AFR 6.57 6.47 6.42 6.38
Rev. Rul. 2002-48, I.R.B. 2002-__.
SPLIT-DOLLAR LIFE INSURANCE . The IRS has
issued proposed regulations relating to the income,
employment and gift taxation of split-dollar life insurance
arrangem nts. The proposed regulations generally define a
split-dollar life insurance arrangement as any arrangement
(that is not part of a group term life insurance plan described
in I.R.C. § 79) between an owner of a life insurance contract
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and a non-owner of the contract under which either party to
the arrangement pays all or part of the premiums, and one of
the parties paying the premiums is entitled to recover (either
conditionally or unconditionally) all or any portion of those
premiums and such recovery is to be made from, or is
secured by, the proceeds of the contract. Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.61-22(b). A special rule applies in the case of an
arrangement entered into in connection with the performance
of services. Under this special rule, a split-dollar life
insurance arrangement is any arrangement (whether or not
described in the general rule) between an owner and a non-
owner of a life insurance contract under which the employer
or service recipient pays, directly or indirectly, all or any
portion of the premiums and the beneficiary of all or any
portion of the death benefit is designated by the employee or
service provider or is any person whom the employee or
service provider would reasonably be expected to name as
beneficiary. (Like the general rule, this special rule does not
apply to any arrangement covered by I.R.C. § 79.) This
special rule also applies to arrangements between a
corporation and another person in that person's capacity as a
shareholder in the corporation under which the corporation
pays, directly or indirectly, all or any portion of the premiums
and the beneficiary of all or a portion of the death benefit is a
person designated by, or would be reasonably expected to be
designated by, the shareholder. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1.
A split-dollar life insurance arrangement (as defined in the
proposed regulations) is taxed under either the economic
benefit regime or the loan regime. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-
22(d). Under the economic benefit regime, the owner of the
life insurance contract is treated as providing economic
benefits to the non-owner of the contract. Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.61-22. Under the loan regime, the non-owner of the life
insurance contract is treated as loaning premium payments to
the owner of the contract. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-15.
The economic benefit regime must apply (and the loan
regime may not apply) to any split-dollar life insurance
arrangement if (i) the arrangement is entered into in
connection with the performance of services, and the
employee or service provider is not the owner of the life
insurance contract, or (ii) the arrangement is entered into
between a donor and a donee (for example, a life insurance
trust) and the donee is not the owner of the life insurance
contract. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-22(d).
The proposed regulations provide rules for determining the
owner and the non-owner of the life insurance contract. The
owner is the person named as the policy owner. If two or
more persons are designated as the policy owners, the first-
named person generally is treated as the owner of the entire
contract. However, if two or more persons are named as the
policy owners and each such person has an undivided interest
in every right and benefit of the contract, those persons are
treated as owners of separate contracts.  Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.61-22(b). 67 Fed. Reg. 45414 (July 9, 2002).
TRUSTS. The debtor owned a corporation as a sole
shareholder and provided computer consulting services for
the corporation. The taxpayer transferred the corporation to a
trust and the trust was transferred to other off-shore trusts.
The taxpayer continued to operate the business as before the
transfers and the trustees had no participation in the operation
of the business or trusts. The court held that the income from
the corporation was included in the taxpayer’s income
becau  the trusts lacked economic substance. The appellate
court affirmed in a decision designated as not for publication.
Lund v. Comm’r, 2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,507
(9th Cir. 2002), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2000-334.
JUDGMENTS
EXECUTION . The plaintiff was the successor to an ethyl
alcohol processing cooperative which had entered into grain
supply agreements with the defendant. When the defendant
refused to perform on the grain supply agreements, the
pl intiff obtained judgments against the defendant. The
plaintiff sued to renew the judgments just under 10 years
after the original judgments and the defendant argued that the
judgments had expired after three years under Minn. Stat.
550.366 because the judgment involved a “debt on
agricultural property.” The court held that the failure to
co ply with the grain supply agreement created a debt
subject to the limitation statute and that a contract to deliver
grain in the future was agricultural property. Therefore, the
judgments expired after three years under the statute.
Westc ster Fire Ins. Co. v. Hasbargen, 632 N.W.2d 754
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
FERTILIZER STORAGE SYSTEM. The plaintiff
purchased a fertilizer containment system from the defendant.
The defendant offered two types of secondary leak protection
ystem, one which primarily caught leakage in order for the
leak to be detected and one which was designed to contain
y leak as well as provide a means of leakage detection. The
plaintif  purchased the first secondary system but failed to
consistently monitor the system for leaks, resulting in a large
spill of f rtilizer into the ground. The plaintiff sued under
several theories of contract and products liability, claiming
that the secondary system failed to contain the leak. The court
held t at the purchase contract identified the secondary
system only as one which was intended to provide monitoring
of a leak and not containment of a leak; therefore, the system
was not defective and did not breach the contract. Mid-
Wood, Inc. v. Hunter Agri-Sales, Inc., 184 F. Supp.2d 689
(N.D. O io 2002).
HERBICIDES . The plaintiff planted an alfalfa crop
immediately after applying a herbicide to the land. The
plaintiff claimed that the herbicide caused poor germination
and growth of the alfalfa. The plaintiff claimed that an
employee of the defendant said that alfalfa could be planted
immediately after application of the herbicide and that this
information was incorrect, although the same information
was on the EPA-approved label. The plaintiff sued the
defendant under theories of breach of express warranty,
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misrepresentation and strict liability. The defendant had
obtained expert opinion that the alfalfa was not damaged by
the herbicide. The court held that the breach of express
warranty claim was preempted by FIFRA because the
representations made by the defendant’s employee matched
the language on the label. The court noted that the other
statements made by the employee involved the herbicide’s
ability to control weeds and not that the product would not
damage the alfalfa; therefore, the statements did not result in
any of the alleged damage and were not actionable. The court
similarly disposed of the fraudulent misrepresentation claims
as either preempted by FIFRA or not connected to the alleged
damage. The court also held that the strict liability claim was
either preempted by FIFRA to the extent it claimed the
instructions for application were defective or unsupported by
any evidence or theory about how the herbicide damaged the
alfalfa. Dillon v. Zeneca Corp., 42 P.3d 598 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2002).
PESTICIDES . The plaintiff was an organic farmer who
suffered personal injury and injury to the plaintiff’s crops
from the spraying of pesticides on neighboring land.
Apparently, the pesticide volatilized during and after
application and drifted onto the plaintiff’s land. The plaintiff
alleged that the pesticide was defectively designed. The
defendant argued that the claim was pre-empted by FIFRA as
involving an issue of the adequacy of the warnings on the
label. The court agreed. Eriksen v. Moray Corp., 41 P.3d
488 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
FERTILIZER. The plaintiff owned a fertilizer company in
Kansas and was subject to inspection fees imposed under
Kan. Stat. § 2-1205. The plaintiff argued that the fees were
unconstitutional because the fees generated by the statute far
exceeded the cost of the fertilizer inspection program and
because the statute was unconstitutionally vague since it
failed to state who must register commercial fertilizer subject
to the fee. The court held that the fee was not unconstitutional
because a portion of the fees was used for the State Water
Fund, because the State Water Fund is used to protect the
water in the state from pollution from fertilizers. The court
held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague because
it identifies who would be liable for a failure to pay the fee,
making it clear who must register the fertilizer involved.
Busby, Inc. v. Kansas Dept. of Agric., 29 P.3d 441 (Kan.
Ct. App. 2001).
MILK . The plaintiffs were dairy farmers who sued the
defendant milk and cheese processors for violations of the
Wisconsin antitrust laws. The plaintiffs argued that the
defendants had presented manipulated data used to determine
prices under a federal milk marketing order. The defendants
argued that the filed rate doctrine barred the suit because the
federal milk marketing order was determined under a federal
system. The plaintiffs argued that the filed rate doctrine did
not apply to state law actions. The court held that the filed
rate octrine barred the action because the Wisconsin
Supreme Court had ruled that the filed rate doctrine applied
to actions brought under Wisconsin law. Servais v. Kraft
Foods, Inc., 631 N.W.2d 629 (Wis. 2001).
STATE TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL USE. The plaintiff purchased 30 acres
of rural land and prepared the land for an oat crop. The land
was poorly tended and the resulting crop had an excessive
amount of weeds, although the crop sold for $1,000. The
plaintiff had also moved the water rights for the land to
another parcel. The county assessor denied the plaintiff’s
application for an agricultural tax exemption for the land,
based on the transfer of the water rights. On appeal to the
state Board of Tax Appeals which upheld the assessor’s
ruling based on the lack of a bona fide profit making
agricultural operation on the land. Under the state Tax
Commission regulations, the agricultural exemption required
a bona fide profit-making agricultural operation on land.
However, the exemption statute, Idaho Code § 63-602(K),
did not include the “bona fide profit making” standard. The
court held that the regulation exceeded the statutory
requirements and was invalid; therefore, the plaintiff should
have been granted the exemption. Roeder Holdings, L.L.C.
v. Ada County, 41 P.3d 237 (Idaho 2001).
TRESPASS
TIMBER. The plaintiff purchased 20 acres of isolated
timberland with a cabin from the defendant. The plaintiff
intended to use the cabin for recreation and wanted to
preserv  the natural environment around the cabin. The
defendant eserved the right to cut timber from the property
but not within 100 feet of the cabin. The defendant hired a
logging company to harvest trees from the property and did
not tell them about the 100 foot restriction. The logging
company cut and removed 12 trees within 100 feet of the
cabin. The defendant admitted that the trees were improperly
cut. The trees were valued as ornamental trees and the award
of the value of the trees was tripled under Wash,. Code §
64.12.030 because the court found that the defendant ordered
the cutting of the trees within the 100 foot restricted area.
Hill . Cox, 41 P.3d 495 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
CITATION UPDATES
Estate of Godley v. Comm’r, 286 F.3d 210 (4th Cir.
2002) (valuation) see p. 78 supra.
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AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINARS
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
August 13-16, 2002  Holiday Inn I-25, Fort Collins, CO
September 24-27, 2002   Interstate Holiday Inn, Grand Island, NE
Come join us for expert and practical seminars on the essential aspects of agricultural tax and law. Gain insight and
understanding from two of the nation’s top agricultural tax and law instructors.
The seminar are held on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Registrants may attend one, two, three or all four
days, with separate pricing for each combination. On Tuesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On
Wednesday, Dr. Harl will cover farm and ranch estate planning. On Thursday, Roger McEowen will cover farm and ranch
business planning. NEW THIS YEAR : On Friday, Roger McEowen will cover agricultural contracts. Your registration fee
includes comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days attended which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The
seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for a small additional charge.
The seminar registration fees  for current subscribers    to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or
Principles of Agricultural Law (and for multiple registrations from one firm) are $185 (one day), $360 (two days), $525 (three
days), and $670 (four days).  The registration fees for    nonsubsc ibers    are $200, $390, $570 and $720, respectively.
Registration brochures were mailed in June and July. However, complete information and a registration form are available
now on our web site at http://www.agrilawpress.com. For more information, call Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-
mail to robert@agrilawpress.com
October 17-18, 2002  Spa Resort, Palm Springs, CA
“Farm & Ranch Income Tax” and “Farm & Ranch Estate and Business Planning.”
The seminars are held on Thursday, and Friday. Registrants may attend one or both days, with separate pricing for each
combination. On Thursday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On Friday, Roger McEowen will cover farm
and ranch estate and business planning. The registration fee includes comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days
attended which will be updated just prior to the seminar.
The seminar registration fees  for current subscribers    to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or
Principles of Agricultural Law (and for multiple registrations from one firm) are $185 (one day), $360 (two days).  The
registration fees for    n nsubscribers    are $200 and $390 respectively.
Registration brochures will be mailed in August. However, complete information and a registration form are available now
on our web site at http://www.agrilawpress.com. For more information, call Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail to
robert@agrilawpress.com
*    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *
SUBSCRIPTION RATE INCREASE
The recent increase in postage rates and increased printing costs over the years have finally forced us to increase the annual
subscription rate for the print version of the Agricultural Law Digest to $110 per year.  This is the first price increase for the
Digest since it began in 1989. The new rates will take effect with the next billing date after July 1, 2002 for each subscriber.
Each billing offers subscribers the option to subscribe to our e-mail version of the Dig st which remains at $90 per year and
which is e-mailed on the Monday before the print version is published. You can beat the rush and change your subscription
now to the e-mail version and we will credit your account with an additional issue for each three print issues remaining on your
subscription. Send an e-mail to robert@agrilawpress.com for a free sample or to order the change in subscription.
